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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the twin crises in Turkey experienced in 2000 and 2001. After a detailed survey of 
currency crisis models, together with a brief descriptive overview of the crises in Turkey, the similarities 
among the twin crises in Turkey and the models that have been developed to explain preceding crises in 
the world are investigated. It is found that the Turkish twin crises cannot be explained by using any 
individual generation of models, namely first generation models, second generation models or third 
generation models. Instead, a combination of these models is more appropriate to explain the details of 
the twin crises. 
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1.  Introduction 
The twin crises in Turkey consist of a banking crisis in November 2000 and 
currency crisis that followed in February 2001.3 The crises were experienced due to a 
sudden increase in the demand for the dollar, which, in turn, caused the level of reserves 
to decrease swiftly. The Turkish government handled the crisis of November 2000, but 
it was not completely successful in handling the one in February 2001. So, the 
government had to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime and began to conduct a 
floating exchange rate regime. After this critical decision, the Turkish lira continued to 
devaluate against the US dollar.4 
This paper analyzes these twin crises in Turkey. Following Akay (2004), we first 
perform a detailed literature survey on currency crisis models. After that, we create a 
brief descriptive overview of the crises in Turkey through which we attempt to find out 
the similarities between the twin crises in Turkey and the models that have been 
developed in order to explain preceding crises in the world. We hope that our detailed 
survey will serve as a reference for future research articles. Our main finding is that the 
Turkish twin crises cannot be explained by using any individual generation of models, 
namely first generation models (FGM), second generation models (SGM) or third 
generation models (TGM). Instead, a combination of these models is more appropriate 
to explain the details of the twin crises. 
                                            
1 The author would like to thank Koray Akay and Giovanni Battista Ramello for their helpful comments 
and suggestions. All remaining errors are the author’s responsibility. 
2 Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, 37235, USA;  
Tel: +1-615-343-2472; fax: +1-615-343-8495; e-mail: hakan.yilmazkuday@vanderbilt.edu 
3 The twin crises refer to the association between the banking crises and balance-of-payments crises, and 
vice versa. In particular, according to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the term “twin crises” is described 
as episodes in which the beginning of a banking crisis is followed within 48 months by a balance-of-
payment crisis. 
4 See Akay and Yilmazkuday (2008) for an analysis of the Turkish economy during the period 1980-2001.  
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The Turkish twin crises are typical cases of crises known as currency crises or 
balance of payment crises. A currency crisis is an occurrence experienced in various 
economies all over the world. The crises that have been analyzed by the economists 
consist of the crisis in Latin America in the 1970s, the crisis in Europe in the early 
1990s, and the crisis in Asia experienced in the late 1990s.  
In general, currency crises are experienced when the government cannot fulfill 
its obligations (Calvo and Vegh, 1999). A typical case occurs in the case of a fixed 
exchange rate regime when the central bank cannot cover the increased demand for 
dollars coming from the individuals and institutions in the economy. As a result, the 
central bank is forced to let the exchange rate float. However, when we analyze the 
underlying reason for this scenario, we realize that this swift increase in demand is 
experienced because speculators, who foresee the devaluation of the currency, want to 
make a profit. This case is known as a speculative attack in the literature. 
Most of the currency crises have been experienced in the countries in which 
governments are not seen as capable of continuing a fixed exchange rate regime. 
However, since all of the crises are experienced after speculative attacks, such 
governments have defended themselves, by accusing the speculators of such crises, and 
stating that the timing of the speculative attacks cannot be anticipated.  
This timing problem has drawn the attention of economists toward speculative 
attacks. First, Krugman (1979) tried to explain the Latin American currency crises by 
introducing his model, which is accepted as the leader of FGM. FGM claims that the 
crises are a result of worsening economic fundamentals. After the crises experienced in 
the early 1990s, SGM have been developed, which not only take into account the 
worsening economic fundamentals, but, in addition to FGM, also focus on the 
expectations of the economy. After the 1997-1998 East Asian financial and currency 
crises, TGM were introduced, which are models of financial sector crises rather than of 
speculative attacks or currency crises per se.5  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce FGM. 
After that, we introduce SGM and TGM in Sections 3 and 4. The examination that 
shows whether the twin crises in Turkey, experienced in 2000 and 2001, can be 
explained by using any of these models is the subject of Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 
concludes.  
2.  First Generation Models (FGM) 
The seminal model of FGM was introduced by Krugman (1979). It was further 
simplified and popularized by Flood and Garber (1984). This leading model shows that, 
in a small open economy with a fixed exchange regime, an excess creation of domestic 
credit relative to money demand growth may generate the conditions for a sudden 
speculative attack against the domestic currency, ultimately leading to the abandonment 
of the fixed exchange rate peg and a switch to a flexible exchange rate regime.  
The Krugman-Flood-Garber model assumes a small open economy with only 
one good. The output is constant and the price of the good is determined by the 
purchasing power parity: 
                                            
5 For recent currency crisis models, some of which focus on contagion issues, see Burnside, Eichenbaum 
and Rebelo (2001a, 2001b, 2004), Neal and Weidenmeir (2002), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh (2003), Lahiri and Vegh (2003), Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2004), Tai (2004), 
Leila and Kestens (2006), Corsetti and Mackowiak (2006), Pesaran and Pick (2007), Pasquariello (2007).  
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where  t P  is the domestic price level, 
*
t P  is the foreign price level, and  t E  is the 
nominal exchange rate. For simplicity, it is assumed that the foreign price level is 
constant and equal to one (
* 1 t P = ). Hence, the price level becomes equal to the nominal 
exchange rate, further implying that the domestic inflation rate is identical to the 
devaluation rate,  t ε . 
The nominal money supply (monetary base) consists of domestic credits (Dt) 
and foreign exchange reserves (Rt):  
 
  tt t M DR =+          [ 2 ]  
 
The real money demand is a negative function of the domestic interest rate, 
alone:
6 
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Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility (which is equivalent to the 
assumption of perfect substitution between domestic and foreign bonds), the nominal 
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where  * i  is the constant foreign interest rate and 
e
t ε  is the expected devaluation 
rate. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, the expected devaluation rate equals the 
actual one (
e
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Suppose that at time t = 0 the central bank fixes the exchange rate at  t EE = % . 
This implies that from then on, the real money demand becomes constant: 
 
  (* ) t LL i =          [ 6 ]  
 
Moreover, suppose that the government is running a constant budget deficit, µ , 
financed by a continuous rise in the level of domestic credits: 
 
  t D µ = &         [ 7 ]  
 
                                            
6 The inclusion of real income, which is assumed to be constant, into this function does not affect the 
analytical structure and the results of the model.  
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where  D & , the derivative of D with respect to time, denotes the change in the 
domestic credits. The ensuing excess supply in the money market will be used to buy 
foreign bonds. As a result, the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank will 
decrease by an amount equal to the increase in the domestic credits:   
 
  tt RDµ =− =− &&        [ 8 ]  
 
In other words, the increasing budget deficit will lead to a continuous fall in the 
foreign exchange reserves. Ultimately, the level of reserves will reach a critical value, 
which can safely be assumed to be zero (R=0). When the reserves fall to this critical 
level (say, at time t=Z) the government will have to abandon the fixed exchange rate 
regime and let the exchange rate float.  
The assumption of perfect foresight implies that the individuals (speculators) are 
aware that, ceteris paribus, the exchange rate will be allowed to float at t = Z. Their 
reaction to this expectation can best be understood with the help of Figure 1. In this 
figure,  t E %  denotes the shadow exchange rate, which is defined to be the rate that would 




According to Figure 1, the exchange rate is fixed at a rate above the shadow 
exchange rate at time t. However, because of the continuous increase in the domestic 
credits, the shadow exchange rate eventually exceeds the fixed rate. Two rates are equal 
at t = T. If the speculators attack at time t = A, they suffer a loss since the exchange rate 
falls. At first glance, one may think that the best time for the speculators to attack is just 
before t = Z. However, at that time the central bank would have very little reserves left, 
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to attack at an earlier time. So, inevitably, the competition among speculators, forces 
them to attack at t = T.  
Thus, the main contribution of FGM to the literature is to show that speculative 
attacks are not arbitrary phenomena, but inevitable reactions necessary for the 
equilibrium of an economy with deteriorating economic fundamentals (an increasing 
budget deficit, in the above example). 
Before the attack, the money supply is constant since the gradual fall in reserves 
is equal to the gradual rise in domestic credits. At the time of the switch, the drastic fall 
in reserves leads to a sharp decrease in money supply.  
On the demand side, the positive devaluation rate at the time of the switch 
causes the nominal interest rate to rise (Eq. 4), leading to a fall in the money demand. 
Hence, the money market equilibrium is restored. The fall in the money demand must 
be equal to the fall in the foreign exchange reserves: 
 
  (* ) (* ) T RL i L i ε ∆= − +        [ 9 ]  
 
After the attack, the government can no longer finance its budget deficit by 
running down its reserves. So it returns to seigniorage financing. Domestic credit 
expansion causes the price level (the exchange rate) to rise continuously. The increase in 
inflation permits the government to finance its budget deficit by seigniorage. So, in the 
steady state: 
  (* ) tt Li ε εµ +=         [ 1 0 ]  
 
holds. The left hand side of Equation (10) is the seigniorage income. 
2.1. Extensions to the Model 
The most unrealistic assumption in the Krugman-Flood-Garber model concerns 
the passive role the government assumes before and during the currency crisis. Even 
though it is obvious that financing a permanent budget deficit by domestic credit 
expansion will lead to an inevitable crisis, the government does nothing either to 
prevent the crisis or to smooth out its negative effects. Accordingly, there have been 
several attempts to extend the model by incorporating more realistic features such as 
sterilization and domestic borrowing. 
2.1.1. Sterilization  
Flood et al., (1996) point out that, in practice, sterilization is commonly 
observed during currency crises. However, it is impossible to incorporate the practice of 
sterilization into the Krugman-Flood-Garber model due to its assumption of perfect 
substitution between domestic and foreign assets. Calvo and Vegh (1999) explain this 
with the following simple reasoning: Assume for a moment that during the attack, the 
government can prevent the fall in money supply by sterilizing the drastic fall in the 
reserves. The money market equilibrium then requires that the money demand does not 
change either. An unchanged money demand means no devaluation (Equation 9), which 
is clearly contradictory with the existence of a crisis. This obvious contradiction is 
eliminated only if the crisis takes place at t = 0.  
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By assuming imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign assets, Flood 
et al., (1996) modify the model to allow for sterilization. Under this assumption, 
Equation (4) becomes: 
 
  * tt t iiε ρ = ++        [ 1 1 ]  
 
where,  t ρ  denotes the risk premium that is defined as: 
 
 
* () tt t t B EB ρβ =−         [ 1 2 ]  
 
Here,  t B  and 
*
t B  denote domestic and foreign bonds held by the private sector, 
respectively andβ  is any positive constant. Thus, an increase in domestic borrowing (an 
increase in t B ), leads to an increase in the risk premium whereas accumulation of foreign 
assets held by the private sector (an increase in
*
t B ) leads to a fall in the risk premium. 
Once sterilization is allowed in the model, the sudden shifts in the money 
market are transferred completely to the bond market. Sterilization by the central bank 
(open market purchases of domestic bonds held by the private sector) leaves the money 
supply intact during the crisis, because the sudden drop in foreign reserves is met by an 
equivalent rise in the domestic assets held by the central bank. 
This, of course, means a fall in  t B . As the speculators invest in foreign bonds, 
*
t B  increases. According to Equation (12), both of these changes cause the risk 
premium to decrease substantially.  
Monetary equilibrium implies that the money demand is also constant during the 
crisis. Hence, according to Equation (11), the expected devaluation rate must be equal 
to the decrease in the risk premium. In other words, whilst the sterilization holds the 
money supply constant, the risk premium has to adjust to keep the money demand 
constant. 
The above example shows that the original model is open to extensions. 
However, Flood and Marion (1998) also point out that the introduction of a stochastic 
risk premium into a perfect foresight model must be considered to be an anomaly. 
2.1.2. Domestic Debt 
In the Krugman-Flood-Garber model, it is the unrealistic assumption of 
seigniorage financing of the budget deficit that causes the fixed exchange rate regime to 
come to an end. Calvo (1996) analyzes the implications of the original model under the 
assumption of financing the budget deficit by domestic borrowing alone. 
Assuming that the government debt is of instant maturity and that the 
government is ready to exchange bonds for cash on a par basis at any time, equation (7) 
is modified as: 
 
  * tt B iB µ =+ &          [ 1 3 ]  
 
which is the modified budget constraint of the government.  t B  denotes the 
domestic debt stock. According to this equation, the government finances both the  
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budget deficit and interest payments by domestic borrowing. Assuming that the initial 
level of domestic debt is equal to zero ( 0 0 B = ), it is clear that equation (13) cannot hold 
forever and that, in the end, the government will have to resort to seigniorage. Hence, as 
in the original model, the speculative attack is inevitable. However, as will be explained 
below, the timing and the results of the speculative attack are different. 
Suppose that, in the event of the attack, the government stops issuing domestic 
debt and starts to finance the deficit by seigniorage. If we assume that the government 
pays all its debt to bondholders, who will try to avoid capital loss, there will be no 
interest payments to be made after the crisis. This means that equation (10) will 
continue to hold. Thus we can conclude that, in this model, the magnitude of the rise in 
inflation and the fall in the real money demand caused by the attack are the same as in 
the original model. 
However, the amount of the reserves lost in this model is clearly greater than in 
the original model, since, in this model, there is no reserve loss before the attack. 
Finally, Calvo (1996) also shows that in the case of debt financing, the crisis takes place 
sooner than it does in the original model.  
3.  Second Generation Models (SGM) 
FGM implicitly assumes that governments care for the continuation of their 
policies (even if they lead to deteriorating fundamentals) more than the preservation of 
the fixed exchange rate regime. However, as Flood et al., (1996) point out, a government 
whose absolute priority is the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate regime can 
succeed at all costs. First, it may try to avoid policies inconsistent with the fixed 
exchange rate regime. Second, if the attack happens all the same, due to a foreign shock 
or the change in speculators’ expectations, for example, it can drive back the attack by in 
any case. There is always an interest rate high enough to make the speculators give up 
the attack. The question is whether the government considers the pursuance of the fixed 
exchange rate regime to be more important than the output loss caused by the rising 
interest rates.  
After the currency crises in the European Monetary System (EMS) in the early 
1990s, it became clear that FGM were unable to explain many features of these crises. 
For example, in most of these countries the economic fundamentals were quite robust. 
Most ran modest budget deficits and some even had budget surpluses. Moreover, 
governments in countries with similar fundamentals reacted to the attacks differently. 
Some defended their exchange rate regimes by letting the interest rates increase sharply 
and/or by replacing their depleting reserves with foreign borrowing, but others gave in. 
These examples show that governments did not play a passive role during the crisis, as is 
the case in the FGM, but that they reacted to it in different ways reflecting their 
priorities. 
3.1. An Illustrative Model: Unemployment and Currency Crises 
Here we demonstrate the main idea behind SGM by an illustrative two-period 
model by Jeanne (1999). The government maintains the fixed parity in the first period, 
1 E E = , but may devalue in the second period. The unemployment rate in the economy 
is given by the expectations-augmented Phillips curve:  
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  21 ()
e UU β απ π =−−         [ 1 4 ]  
 
where U1 and U2 are the deviations of the unemployment rate from its natural 
level in periods one and two, respectively, and π
e  is the expected rate of inflation.  
Suppose that the government decides whether or not to devalue by minimizing 




2 () LU C δ =+         [ 1 5 ]  
 
where δ  is a dummy variable indicating the policymaker’s decision (equal to one 
if he or she devalues, zero if not), and C is the opting-out cost. The opting-out cost 
comprises the loss of the advantage of the fixed exchange rate regime and the credibility 
loss. 
The private agents form their expectations of devaluation with either probability 
zero or probability one. Suppose that the private agents do not expect any devaluation 
in the second period (π = 0
e ). Then, if the government devalues the currency, the loss 
function gives: 
 
  βα π =−+
2
1 ()
D LU C        [ 1 6 ]  
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The government decides whether or not to devalue by considering equations 




D     ⇒   
απ
C
 - 2βU1 < - απ  ⇒   Devaluation is preferred 
L
D > L
F     ⇒   
απ
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 - 2βU1 > - απ  ⇒ Fixed exchange rate is preferred 
 
Now suppose that the private agents expect a devaluation in the second period. 





D LU C β =+  (1) 
 
and the loss under the fixed exchange rate regime is: 
 
  β απ =+
2
1 ()
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 - 2βU1 <  απ  ⇒   Devaluation is preferred  
 









F      ⇒    
απ
C
 - 2βU1 >  απ  ⇒   Fixed exchange rate is preferred 
  
Let us define φ = 
απ
C
 - 2βU1 and call it the “fundamental variable” of the 
model. We can summarize the whole model by the help of a tree diagram presented in 
Figure 2. 
 
 Figure 2 
 
As the figure shows, if φ < -απ , the government will devalue regardless of the 
expectations of the private agents. Similarly, whenever φ > απ , the government will 
keep the exchange rate fixed whatever the expectations of the private agents are.  
However, in the interval (– απ  < φ < απ ), the result depends completely on 
the expectations of private agents. If the agents expect a devaluation (π e = π ), there 
will be a speculative attack, and the government will have to devalue; if agents expect no 
devaluation (π e = 0), there will be no speculative attack, and the exchange rate will 
continue to remain constant. Thus, there are multiple equilibria in this interval.  
It is important to note that whether or not the outcome will depend on 
expectations, depends solely on the value assumed by the fundamental variable φ, which 
plays a similar role as the concept of economic fundamentals plays in the FGM.7 The 
condition φ > απ  implies that either the cost of abandoning the fixed exchange rate 
regime (C) is too high and/or the unemployment in the first period (U1) is very low. 
Even if the agents expect a devaluation and attack, the government will resist because it 
is more profitable to keep the exchange rate fixed. In the opposite case where φ < -απ , 
the government will find it to be more profitable to devaluate because either the low 
opting-out cost is very low and/or the unemployment rate is very high.  
                                            
7 Note that the definition of economic fundamentals here is more general than it is in FGM because it 
comprises even factors like opting-out cost, which are difficult to measure. Jeanne (1999) considers this 
as an advantage and points out that it enhances the explanatory power of SGM compared to FGM. 
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If the economy is in the uncertainty zone, a continuos rise in unemployment 
and/or a continuous fall in opting-out cost (thus, a continuous decrease in φ) will cause 
the economy to enter into the devaluation zone and a currency crisis will occur. 
Therefore, even in the uncertainity zone, economic fundamentals may play an important 
role in the dynamics of the crisis. 
The analysis so far clearly demonstrates that, contrary to some critiques (e.g., 
Krugman, 1996), SGM do not ignore or underestimate the role of economic 
fundamentals during the crisis, but they introduce an additional explanatory factor 
which is missing in FGM, namely, the expectations held by the agents. If the economy is 
in the uncertainty zone, a currency crisis can take place even if the economic 
fundamentals (the value of φ) are intact. In this case, it is not the deteriorating economic 
fundamentals but the shifts in the expectations of the agents (or “animal spirits”) that 
cause the crisis.  
3.2. Other Second Generation Models 
In the heart of SGM, lies the assumption that governments perform 
optimizations subject to some constraints. Hence, the models in this genre differ from 
each other mainly in their specification of loss functions and constraints. 
In the previous section, we used an example in which the government’s main 
concern was a rise in the rate of unemployment. In that model, it was the level of 
unemployment that forced the government to devalue (to increase inflation). Obviously, 
there can be several other factors that may force the government to give up the fixed 
exchange rate regime. One such factor is the real domestic debt. Governments may 
choose to devalue in order to decrease the real value of domestic debt. In this case, the 
decision of the government is reduced to an optimal taxation problem based on a choice 
between taxation and seigniorage. De Kock and Grilli (1993), Obsfeld (1994), and 
Velasco (1996) have considered such an approach. A high level of real domestic debt 
(just like the high level of unemployment in the above example) leads definitely to a 
currency crisis. If the level of the domestic debt is in a specific interval, (uncertainty 
zone) then self-fulfilling attacks and multiple equilibria may occur. Cole and Kehoe 
(1996) develop a similar model in which the factor affecting the decision of the 
government is not only the level of domestic debt but also its maturity structure.  
Obstfeld (1994) defines the devaluation rate (ε) as an endogenous variable 
determined by the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This small change 
in the illustrative model explained in the previous section leads to an interesting result. 
Remember that, in FGM, the ideal condition for a speculative attack to take place was 
that the shadow exchange rate exceeds the fixed exchange rate. However, in SGM, this 
condition is no longer ideal. This is because if the difference between the two rates is 
sufficiently small, the benefit of devaluation may fall short of the opting-out cost.  
In another model, Drazen and Masson (1994) analyze the case in which the 
private agents do not know the level of the opting-out cost (C). Remember that the 
greater this cost is, the more resistant the government will be to a speculative attack. If 
this parameter is known by the private agents, whether or not the economy is in the 
uncertainty zone, is also known. But, if the private agents do not know this parameter, 
things get a little more complicated. To see how, consider an increase in the rate of 
unemployment. This reduces the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime, because it 
is known that a higher unemployment rate makes the government more vulnerable. On  
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the other hand, if the government perseveres in its commitment to the fixed exchange 
rate regime, this gives the message that the cost of opting-out is too high, and this 
message will raise the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime. In such a case, the 
dominant effect on the credibility of the regime will depend on the parameters of the 
model.  
 
4.  Third Generation Models (TGM) 
The crises that took place in the late 1990s in Asia rekindled interest in the 
currency crises one more time. But, in these crises, two factors that have not been 
mentioned in FGM and SGM came into the picture: The role of the banking sector and 
the contagion of crises.  
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) explain the link between the banking crises and the 
currency crises as follows: Deposits at domestic banks constitute an important part of 
the domestic assets that investors will attempt to convert into foreign assets in a 
currency crisis. Thus, a run on the currency is typically associated with a run on the 
banking system. This relationship makes it clear why the banking system will have a 
crisis when there is a currency crisis. However, according to Saxena and Wong (1999), 
during the Asian crisis, the causality ran in the opposite direction; the crisis in the 
banking sector led to a currency crisis.  
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001a) support this view. In their model, 
the government undertakes the possible costs of the banking system implicitly by 
insuring the deposits at commercial banks. In this setup, an imminent banking sector 
crisis will signal a huge budget deficit in the future even if the economic fundamentals 
are currently strong. If the government does not want to increase taxes or reduce its 
expenditure, there are two ways left to finance the budget deficit: to decrease the level of 
real domestic debt by inflation (devaluation) or seigniorage. However, both of these 
policies contradict the fixed exchange rate regime. Under the assumption of perfect 
foresight, the agents will realize that the government is bound to abandon the fixed 
exchange rate regime. Thus, they carry out a speculative attack. This model is very 
similar to the FGM. However, it differs in that it allows the possibility of a crisis even 
when the economic fundamentals are strong. At the time when people realize that the 
banking sector will have a crisis, there may be neither a huge budget deficit, nor an 
increase in money supply. In a way, this model shows that FGM, too, is capable of 
explaining crises in economies without deteriorating fundamentals. 
History has shown that currency crises can be contagious. It can quickly spread 
not only to neighbor economies but to others that are geographically far away. So, more 
recent models try to explain this phenomenon as well. The first explanation that comes 
to mind is that the countries in crisis have similar fundamental weaknesses and/or they 
are hit by the same foreign shock. Jeanne (1999), however, claims that this is not 
confirmed on empirical grounds.  
Another approach places emphasis on the importance of foreign trade in the 
process of contagion. If a country devalues its currency due to a crisis, this forces the 
partners and rivals of that country to devalue their currencies as well. Jeanne (1999) 
points out that the level of foreign trade between countries does not seem to be high 
enough to be a primary cause of contagion. 
Drazen (1998) provides a different explanation for contagion. A crisis in one of 
the emerging economies affects the expectations of the foreign investors concerning  
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other emerging economies in a negative way. This mechanism becomes clearer if the 
crisis takes place as a result of deterioration in some fundamentals that are difficult to 
observe or measure. As an example for such fundamentals, Drazen (1998) mentions the 
problems in the banking sectors of the Asian countries. Neither the nature of the 
relationship between the banks and the firms, nor the problem in the regulation of the 
banking system is easy to observe. Any crisis caused by such bad fundamentals may lead 
the foreign investors to expect similar problems in the fundamentals of similar 
countries. As one might guess, this approach is similar to SGM. Changes in the 
expectations of the investors lead to speculative attacks if the economic fundamentals of 
the economy are weak enough. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) classify the models on the links between banking 
and currency crises into three groups. In the first group, the chain of causation runs 
from the balance of payments problems to the banking crisis. Under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, an external shock, such as an increase in foreign interest rates, will result in 
the loss of reserves leading to a credit crunch, increased bankruptcies, and financial 
crisis. As Mishkin (1996) points out, if devaluation occurs, the position of banks could 
be weakened further if a large share of their liabilities is denominated in foreign assets.  
The second group of models point to a causal direction in the opposite way. 
When central banks finance the bailout of troubled financial institutions by printing 
money, we return to the basic FGM story of a currency crisis caused by excessive 
money creation.  
The third group asserts that currency and banking crises have common causes. 
They stress the fact that exchange rate based stabilization programs have well-defined 
dynamics. Because inflation converges to international levels only gradually, the real 
exchange rate appreciates considerably. The appreciating currency and the economic 
boom in the early stages of the program cause the current account deficit to widen. This 
undermines the credibility of the program and causes an attack against the domestic 
currency. Since the boom is usually financed by a surge in bank credit, as banks borrow 
abroad, the resulting capital outflows lead to a collapse of the banking system. 
The models summarized in this section can be classified as TGM. Jeanne (1999) 
points out, however, that these models should be considered only as extensions to FGM 
and SGM because they do not offer a new approach but try to explain the recent 
developments using the same theoretical framework. 
5.  A Brief Overview of the Twin Crises  
Inflation has been the main issue in the Turkish economy starting in the 1980s, 
so several disinflation programs supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
have been employed accordingly.8 After many disappointments, a pre-announced 
crawling peg exchange rate policy was adopted starting in December 1999. It was called 
pre-announced, because according to this disinflation program, the timing and the 
degree of the exchange rate widening would be pre-announced. This pre-announcement 
was seen as the most important strength of the program.9 
In order to support the disinflation program, several reforms have also been 
achieved in the banking sector. This, together with the borrowing strategy of the 
government from abroad, led interest rates to fall significantly. In other words, the 
                                            
8 See Akay and Yilmazkuday (2008). 
9 See Akyuz and Boratav (2002), Ozatay and Sak (2002).  
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following mechanism was in effect as the Central Bank was committed not to engage in 
sterilization:  
S
DOLLAR TL DOLLAR CB R < R         capital inflow       S        M        i →→ ↑ → ↑ → ↓
 
After some time, the Turkish economy became dependent on the capital 
inflows. So, everything should have been perfect as long as the foreign capital was kept 
in the economy. However, the problems in the banking sector didn’t let this happen. 
Despite the regulatory reforms in the banking sector, there were still two more sources 
of the problem: 1) The private banks had been financed from abroad, thus they were 
open to exchange rate risks; 2) The state banks had high duty loss values, so they were 
open to interest rate risk. For instance, Demirbank, which was one of the private banks 
in Turkey, had an extremely risky position in that it had a substantial government 
securities portfolio, financed through short-term borrowing from international money 
markets. When Demirbank had liquidity problems, in order to not exceed the IMF 
ceilings on net domestic assets, the Central Bank did not lend to Demirbank. Since 
Demirbank could not borrow from the market or the Central Bank, it started selling 
government bonds at lower prices, thus at higher interest rates. This, in turn, gave rise 
to capital outflows and thus a decrease in the Central Bank reserves. This process 
continued with enormous interest rates, such as 800 percent on December 2000, and 
ended up with having and an additional 7.5 billion dollars of IMF loans to support the 
on-going program. 
Although the short-lived crisis at the end of 2000 was eliminated, dependency 
on the short-term capital flows and the vulnerability of the banking sector signaled the 
possibility of a new crisis. Unless the foreign direct investment would enter the Turkish 
economy, the disinflation program would fail as before. The realization of this scenario 
was inevitable, especially after the political crisis between the Prime Minister and the 
President in February 2001. This political crisis hit the market in a devastating way. First 
of all, the liquidity problem came into the picture. Second, the official reserves of the 
Central Bank fell down dramatically. As a result, the interest rates were up to around 
4000 percent in annual terms.10 The only remaining policy for the authorities was to 
abandon the fixed exchange rate in this economic environment. The government acted 
accordingly, which resulted in forty percent devaluation against the U.S. dollar. This 
whole process caused inflation to reach above one hundred percent (in annual terms) in 
both March and April 2001.  
6.  Analysis of the Twin Crises  
The novelty of the exchange rate regime that was launched in December 1999 
was that both the exit strategy and the date of exit were publicly known at the very 
beginning of the program. It was announced that after eighteen months, the exchange 
rate would be allowed to fluctuate in a continuously widening band. What caused a sky-
high overnight rate, as much as 6200 percent in uncompounded terms, and a huge 
decline 11 in foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank on February 23, 2001, just 
four months before the exit day, and the exchange rate system to collapse and the 
Central Bank to declare that it would allow the exchange rate to float freely? We gave a 
brief answer to this question; but now, we will analyze the characteristics of the crises, 
                                            
10 See Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001). 
11 As a result of the attack, the Central Bank lost almost 20 percent of its foreign exchange reserves while 
the average overnight rate jumped to 873 percent again in uncompounded terms.   
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and investigate whether or not they can be explained by using any of the currency crisis 
models that we introduced earlier. 
First, we will investigate whether the twin crises can be explained by using first 
generation models (FGM). It is shown by Ozatay and Sak (2002), the budget deficit was 
not financed by the Central Bank resources in the period preceding the crisis. That is, 
the central element of the first generation models was not on the stage. Moreover, just 
two days before the burst of the turmoil, which was on November 17, 2000, the reserve 
level was 24.4 billion dollars. Hence, in the periods preceding the crisis, prerequisites of 
the FGM were absent. Namely, public sector borrowing requirements were never met 
through the Central Bank resources and there is no evidence that the crisis had been 
expected long before its occurrence.  
We showed that the twin crises in Turkey cannot be explained by FGM. But, 
what about the extensions of FGM? Remember in the original model of FGM, the 
cause of the crisis was the critical amount of the reserves. However, in Calvo’s (1996) 
model, the reserves are constant during the fixed exchange regime. Here, continuously 
increasing domestic debt makes the individuals question whether the debt will be paid 
back by the government. Realizing that the paying back is possible only in the case of 
seigniorage, the individuals begin to expect inflation (thus devaluation), and as in the 
original model, the speculative attack starts.  
Calvo’s model shows that if the government finances its budget deficit by 
borrowing instead of printing money, the economy will experience the same level of 
inflation at an earlier time and the Central Bank will lose more reserves. Thus, the 
government can only mask the loss of reserves, but the individuals realize the possible 
results of this policy via perfect foresight. In the end, the government is the one that 
loses. Thus, we can conclude that the twin crises in Turkey can partly be explained by 
Calvo’s model, which is an extension of the FGM. Since the expectation of inflation can 
be partly explained by second-generation models (SGM), which explains the crises by 
the expectation about it, we can also conclude that SGM are explanatory for the twin 
crises. But, can these models explain the banking crisis, which is the other part of the 
twin crises?  
Partly explaining the twin crises by such models does not change the fact that 
the fiscal fundamentals in 2000 in isolation were indeed weak. Moreover, in the five-year 
period preceding the crisis, the macroeconomic fundamentals of the last two years were 
the worst. Furthermore, as we explained before, in the period preceding the crisis, an 
open foreign exchange position was a structural feature of the Turkish banking system. 
Maturity mismatch was another structural feature of the banking system in Turkey due 
to the inability of domestic banks to borrow long term in the domestic currency.  
The banking sector problem in Turkey was basically a result of a mechanism 
chosen to finance a very high public sector borrowing requirement. First, this led to an 
increase in government debt instruments especially in balance sheets of private banks. 
Second, it caused a significant deterioration in state-owned banks by accumulating duty 
losses. Risk accumulation in bank balance sheets in order to carry the domestic debt 
stock, looks to be an important element to understand crisis dynamics. When due to 
excessive risks accumulated in the balance sheets, credit lines to some banks that were 
acting as market makers in the government debt instruments market were cut off, the 
banking sector problem turned into a debt rollover problem increasing interest rates. 
The rise in interest rates turned the problem into a debt sustainability issue directly 
making rollover impossible. Based on the above discussion, we can say that the Turkish  
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financial system, which was dominated by banks, was vulnerable to a jump in both the 
exchange rate and interest rate that a sudden capital reversal could cause (Ozatay and 
Sak, 2002). Despite the similarities, the Turkish crises have some features that do not fit 
in the third-generation models. Most notable of them is the high budget deficit, which is 
mainly financed by domestic and foreign debt.  
Nevertheless, we can find more similarities between the Turkish crises and one 
of the TGM classifications of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). According to their 
definition, exchange rate based stabilization programs have well-defined dynamics. 
Because inflation converges to international levels only gradually, there is a marked 
cumulative real exchange rate appreciation. Also, at the early stages of the plan there is a 
boom in imports and economic activity, financed by borrowing abroad. As the current 
account deficit continues to widen, financial markets become convinced that the 
stabilization program is unsustainable, fueling an attack against the domestic currency. 
Since the boom is usually financed by a surge in bank credit, as banks borrow abroad, 
when the capital inflows become outflows and asset markets crash, the banking system 
caves in. It is also modeled to how financial liberalization together with microeconomic 
distortions such as implicit deposit insurance can make boom-bust cycles even more 
pronounced by fueling the lending boom that leads to the eventual collapse of the 
banking system.  
We can say that Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) definition of TGM almost 
exactly explains the twin crises in Turkey. However, in Turkey, in addition to their TGM 
definition, there occurred a political crisis between the president and the prime minister, 
which led to worsening economic expectations of the investors. Thus, there are also 
some clues that indicate the possibility of SGM. Moreover, remember that according to 
some economists, TGM are only extended combinations of FGM and SGM. We can 
clearly realize this fact by taking into account the factors that led to the crises in Turkey: 
high budget deficit, the role of expectations, and the banking sector. The first two of 
these factors play a crucial role in FGM and SGM, but they are also the key features of 
TGM. Thus, we can conclude that the twin crises in Turkey can be explained by using a 
combination of each of the three models, namely FGM, SGM, and TGM. 
7.  Conclusions 
We attempted to summarize the recent theoretical models that try to explain the 
currency crises in the world. We first analyzed first generation models (FGM). These 
models were not only the first attempt to explain the currency crises, but also have 
shown that the main reason for the currency crises was the deteriorated economic 
fundamentals, opposed to the view that they occurred because of the changes in 
speculative expectations. Although FGM are old fashioned, most of the recent 
economists still use FGM in order to explain the dynamics of the currency crises. 
  After that, we analyzed both second generation models (SGM) and third 
generation models (TGM). As opposed to FGM that focuses on the deteriorated 
economic fundamentals, SGM gives more importance to the government that is 
responsible for giving the optimal decision under variable economic conditions. 
Through this new approach, SGM has shown that the currency crises were due not only 
to deteriorated economic fundamentals, but also to sudden shifts of the private agents. 
Thus, SGM is able to explain the currency crises that were not able to be explained by 
FGM. The point here is that SGM can shed light on the crises that occur even when 
there is nothing wrong with the economic fundamentals. However, the deficiency of  
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SGM is that they cannot include the expectations component into the model in a 
satisfactory way. Relating the currency crises to expectations of which reasons are not 
known means that the main motivations of crises are not known.  
TGM are the final contributions to the theory. TGM, which emerged after Asian 
crises, are the models that try to model the relationship between banking and currency 
crises by using the concept of contagion. But since these models are so close to FGM 
and SGM in a general way, most economists claim that it is a mistake to call these 
models TGM. To conclude, the competition among FGM, SGM, and TGM still 
continues. Nevertheless, it is clear that the models, which can explain the currency crises 
that will be experienced in the future, will be the winner of this competition.  
After reviewing theoretical literature, we analyzed the twin crises in Turkey 
(2000, 2001). We focused on the background and the occurrence of the crises. First, we 
presented a brief overview of the crises and mentioned the main characteristics of the 
Turkish economy during the crises. In this sense, we emphasized the importance of an 
exit strategy, the role of the interest rate as the main political tool, the liquidity crisis of 
the banking sector (both private and state-owned), the dependency on the short-term 
capital flows, and the political crisis between the president and the prime minister.  
Following the overview of the crises, we attempted to find out the similarities 
between the twin crises in Turkey (2000, 2001) and the models that had been developed 
in order to explain preceding crises in the world. We concluded that the twin crises in 
Turkey cannot be explained by using any individual generation of models. Instead, a 
combination of three generations of models, namely FGM, SGM, and TGM, is more 
appropriate to explain the details of the twin crises.   
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